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Abstract  
 
Crisis in and around Ukraine is becoming the first 
show-case in multilateral diplomacy, where Remotely 
Piloted Aircraft  Systems (RPAS) and other 
technologies are deployed to produce information for 
the diplomatic processes of the Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)and to 
public at the same time. This has taken place in a very 
rapid manner without time for descent planning and 
through learning by doing before and in the middle of 
the start and development of the crisis special 
monitoring mission based on the consensus of 57 
member states. 
This paper approaches these multi-lateral 
diplomacy scenes by looking at the work done through 
two disciplines which “orchestrate”; Social Science 
and Information Systems. Abbot et al. orchestration 
theory application into OSCE and to its “Ukraine 
toolbox” needs more research, in which e.g. IS 
literature´s socio-technical modeling methods will be 
helpful in order to bridge recognized gaps from 
practice and literature.  
Information system researchers and developers 
are needed in more active roles as intermediaries to 
complement existing principal-agent e.g. OSCE-
RPAS and other ICT vendor relationships. More 
theoretical and empirical research is needed to make 
the IGOs’ orchestration to meet what ICT can offer 
for future crisis diplomacy. 
Keywords: Inter-governmental Organizations 
(IGOs), orchestration theory, Remotely Piloted 
Aircraft System (RPAS), multilateral diplomacy, 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(OSCE), information system development, Ukraine 
Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) 
 
 
1. Introduction: OSCE as an IS 
Orchestrator in Crisis Scenes 
Including “in and around Ukraine” 
 
 
The foundations for the Organization on Security and 
Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) were laid down in the 
preparatory process for the Helsinki Final Act signed in 
Helsinki conference by heads of states 1975. [1] 
 
The Organization for Security and Co-operation in 
Europe (OSCE) is the world's largest security-oriented 
intergovernmental organization (later as IGO). Its 
mandate includes issues such as arms control and the 
promotion of human rights, freedom of the press and 
fair elections. It employs around 3,500 (, of which 1106 
people in Ukraine Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) 
at the 31st August 2016) people, mostly in its field 
operations but also in its secretariat in Vienna, Austria, 
and its institutions. The OSCE is concerned with early 
warning, conflict prevention, crisis management, and 
post-conflict rehabilitation. Its 57 participating states 
are located in Europe, northern and central Asia and 
North America and cover much of the land area of the 
Northern Hemisphere. It was created during the Cold 
War era as an East–West forum. [2][3][4] 
 
As the personnel numbers above show among the field 
operations the weight of Ukraine SMM is big. One 
interviewee for this study described OSCE 
 
 “…as politically born again, because no other organization 
– if any- is capable of tackling crisis in and around 
Ukraine”.[5], 
 
 as Ukrainian crisis is expressed in diplomatic OSCE 
language (bolded by author above). 
 
The essence of Ukraine SMM is presented in the 
following table: 
 
Table 1. Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine [4] 
  
Who we are? 
-Unarmed civilian monitors;  
-Over 700 monitors across Ukraine;  
-Over 580 based in the east ;  
-From 45 participating States.  
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What we do? 
-Report the facts as we observe and establish them;  
-Gather information and report on the security situation;  
-Report on the humanitarian situation and people’s  
needs, and facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid of 
other organizations;  
-Help to establish dialogue and local ceasefires.  
 
Important to understand:  
-It is up to the sides to stop the fighting;  
-We do not conduct investigations, but report on facts;  
-We do not deliver, but facilitate the delivery of 
humanitarian aid of other organizations 
 
 
So far, the OSCE’s outputs in reporting about crisis in 
and around Ukraine, has been well received by their 
audiences at least by numbers according to following 
table 2 [3]. 
 
 
Table 2. Ukraine Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) 
Reporting By Numbers in 2015 [3] 
 
306 DAILY REPORTS 
51 WEEKLY REPORTS 
30 SPOT REPORTS 
8 THEMATIC REPORTS 
4 BRIEFINGS to the UN Security Council 
THOUSANDS of media clips 
OVER 16,000 Twitter followers 
@OSCE_SMM 
OVER 5,600 Facebook likes 
 
As the table 2 shows OSCE´s SMM has widened its 
informating beyond WWW and mailing services to 
Twitter and Facebook. 
 
 
Picture 1. OSCE SMM monitors assessing the impact 
of shelling in Mariupol, January 2015 [6] 
 
All these required information for reports etc. has been 
acquired by patrols on the ground by the end of year 
2015 (see picture above) with over 4 million km of 
patrolling – 100 times the distance around the globe by 
over 18,000 patrols utilizing 284 armored vehicles plus 
civilian commercial – not military - remotely piloted 
aircraft systems (RPASs), which puts SMM’s eyes on 
the sky, which are not always welcomed by fighting 
parties. In some cases have shot OSCE´s SMM´s 
remotely piloted aircrafts (RPAs) down or jammed their 
radio links. [3] 
 
1.1. Two Disciplines, Which “Orchestrate” 
 
When an IGO - like in Ukraine SMM - is deploying its 
relatively small resources to address large challenges by 
bringing together available public and private actors´ 
activities, these activities have been described by the 
verb “to orchestrate” after a genuine theory laying 
Social Science studies conducted by Abbot et al. [10] 
in an international research project 2009-2015. It would 
be too simple to say in terms of information systems, 
that to orchestrate is to in-, out- or right-source, even if 
it has some features of all these sourcing modes. 
Orchestration theory in this context [explained deeper 
in chapter 2.] 
 
Following are four examples of the uses of term 
“orchestrate” from another discipline, Information 
Systems (IS): 
 
Firstly, Jessup and Valacich.(1993) [11] described 
“orchestrated workflow” as one scenario for group 
support system development trajectories,which 
nowadays look very modest when taking into account 
the multiplicity of new technologies. Their scenario 
affected the work of Lyytinen et al. [7] [8] and Knuuttila 
et al. [9]. 
 
Secondly, service orchestration plays an important part 
in a service-oriented architecture (SOA). Web service 
orchestration can be contrasted with web service 
choreography, the execution of asynchronous tasks 
without a central coordinator. [12] 
 
Thirdly, a cloud orchestrator is programming that 
manages the interconnections and interactions among 
cloud-based and on-premises business units. To 
orchestrate something is to arrange various components 
so they achieve a desired result. In an IT context, this 
involves combining tasks into workflows so the 
provisioning and management of various IT 
components and their associated resources can be 
automated. This endeavor is more complex in a cloud 
environment because it involves interconnecting 
processes running across heterogeneous systems in 
multiple locations. [13] 
 
Fourthly, Ross and Beck [14] have presented an article 
on “How to Orchestrate IT Project Portfolios More 
Successfully” from the risk management angle. 
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All four orchestrating examples deal with governance 
like Abbot et al. [10], but mainly in a limited technical 
business context. How much these IS related 
“orchestrations” have to do with the present ICT 
environment of the OSCE will remain as subject for 
further studies, which require different sets of people to 
be interviewed from the OSCE. 
Lyytinen et al. [7] have shown, that the Conference for 
Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), direct 
predecessor of OSCE, community and multi-lateral 
diplomacy need advanced approaches from MIS 
researchers, too, who have been addressing mainly 
single business organizations in Computer Supported 
Co-operative Work (CSCW) literature. 
 
Further Lyytinen et al. [8] have demonstrated why and 
how multi-lateral diplomacy is not business as usual nor 
unusual business, that needed special constructs of 
hard- and software in terms of CSCW.  
 
Knuuttila et al. [9] drafted a concept for diplomats’   
work station for multi-lateral conferencing before 
mobile computing era. 
 
These studies on applying at that time modern meeting 
support IS into multilateral diplomatic procedures 
released meeting support system´s forerunner Jay F. 
Nunamaker´s proverb about power-fullness of 
diplomacy cited in the beginning.  
 
1.2. Applying Modern Mobile IT in the 
Form of RPASs into the Ukraine SMM 
 
This chapter will show why and how the applying now 
modern mobile ISs in the form of RPASs into to the 
day´s multilateral diplomacy is still challenging and 
keeping “diplomacy very powerful environment” for IS 
vendors as developers and researchers, also. 
 
Let us the interviewees [5] for this study to describe the 
deployment of RPASs (named UAVs in OSCE 
language): 
 
“There was hard political pressure to get the 
propellers in to air and nobody thought, what the f**k to 
do with the data... western states´ representatives saw 
UAVs as magic bullets… 
The company , who won the first bidding for UAVs, 
told , that the first possible deployment would be in 4 
months, but the Swiss [who were the OSCE´s 
chairmanship country at the time] stressed , that UAVs 
must be deployed within the mission([SMM) in one 
month… 
Nobody really had time to think, what we are doing… 
containers were put on the road to Kiev for test flights and 
operation was built in a month! 
 
The UAVs were deployed on a commercial basis, because 
military UAVs of western countries flown by their 
uniformed officers were out of question for Russians.” 
 
A summary of these lines tell, that this process did not 
go by the book or discipline with or without 
orchestrating written before. Neukirch [15] has 
published a more polished chronology of this process, 
which will be cited later.  
 
At the end of the day and the month everything is 
political in the OSCE. Politicking and understanding its 
consequences was and will be part of the job for 
diplomats, IS designers, vendors, researchers etc. in the 
OSCE context. 
 
1.3.Research Question  
 
The main research question for this paper is: 
  
What lessons can be learned for further IGOs´ 
orchestration from the OSCE’s work in 
deploying information systems, e.g. RPASs, 
into crisis in and around Ukraine for future 
multi-lateral crisis diplomacy? 
The lessons will be formed from recognizing and 
bridging as far as possible the gaps between different 
actors in multi-lateral diplomacy process seen from the 
research angle. These gaps will be recognized from 
diplomatic political mood-oriented-practice and from 
mode-oriented Social Science and Information Systems 
literature as described in the next chapters. 
 
The developments around the use of social media 
(see above Table 2 ) must have been left out from this 
article due to space limitations as well as the latest 
technical developments in commercially available 
security related ICT, which might facilitate the work of 
Ukraine SMM. 
 
The target is to survey the way for further research 
by raising new topics to the agenda by recognizing 
existing gaps derived from practice and literature. 
  
2. The OSCE as an Orchestrator; 
Recognizing the Gap from 
Literature 
In building hypotheses for orchestration studies two 
contrasting models are used. The O-I-T-model specifies 
the relationships between an orchestrator (O), which 
enlists and supports the activities of an intermediary (I), 
which in turn governs the behaviorlof one or more 
targets (T). O-I-T-model is contrasted with the P-A-
model, which specifies the relationship between a 
principal (P), which delegates tasks, and an agent (A), 
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which carries them out. Knitting these models together 
starts with the observation, that states are principals to 
IGOs as agents, but IGOs are orchestrators of 
intermediaries who (sometimes) have states as targets. 
[10] 
 
Orchestration highlights nuanced relationships among 
governance actors, whereas many literatures on global 
governance focus on particular actors seen as acting 
largely in isolation. More concretely, orchestration 
highlights the inner workings of regime complexes and 
other governance structures: in contrast to dominant 
literature, it emphasizes how participants with agency 
create, maintain and manage governance complexes. 
 
Orchestration theory helps us analyze how IGOs 
interact with their institutional ecosystems, with each 
participant shaping the others’ authority [10] e.g. OSCE 
helps state the authority of non-state actors in and 
around Ukraine. 
 
The five general orchestration techniques are widely 
used and often in combination, according to several 
case study investigations in the volume of International 
Organizations as Orchestrators: convening, agenda 
setting, assistance, endorsement and coordination.  
 
Convening is used to create purpose-built 
intermediaries. Assistance plays a special role in 
supporting rule implementation. Endorsement is 
particularly important for rule-making intermediaries. 
Agenda setting and coordination, while used in many 
contexts, are especially important for orchestrating 
regime complexes. [10] 
 
Dai [16] in his article titled as this chapter in Abbot et 
al [10] argues, that IGOs rationally adapt to their 
strategic environment by working around binding 
constraints and tapping into alternative resources made 
available by non-state actors. Under certain 
circumstances, it may be both efficient and effective for 
IGOs to enlist non-state intermediaries to help monitor 
and enforce states´ compliance. In this sense, Dai 
argues, that orchestration is an optimal strategy of 
adaptation.[16]  
 
Dai provides empirical support through comparative 
study of IGOs for Abbots et al.´s orchestration theory 
hypotheses, especially goal divergence and 
intermediary availability. However, Dai finds the 
chances for greater orchestration in these areas smaller 
for Security IGOs than for Human Rights IGOs. (See 
[16 , 150-155] The OSCE by its nature is Security IGO 
and on the other hand Human Rights IGO as well as 
Environmental IGO and Trade IGO at the same time, 
too, which all four are categories in Dai´s analysis, 
which does not cover the OSCE at all as main research 
object. This is the case in whole project described in the 
volume of Abbot et al. [10]. 
 
There is no literature, which studies OSCE as an avant 
garde IGO related to the orchestration theory. For 
example, the OSCE as an IGO is many-faced difficult 
research object: it can act in some cases according to 
military rules (e.g. monitoring military exercises) and 
in some cases according to civil rules (e.g. monitoring 
elections). Given the 14 instruments of “Ukraine 
toolbox” [see paragraph xx] with their mandate 
principles and procedures, they are not easily 
categorized to fit into present orchestration theory’s 
taxonomies derived from more single-area governing 
IGOs. 
 
As stated above SMM revitalized the OSCE as a major 
player in the international scenes of diplomacy and its 
rapid and innovative use of RPASs revealed again the 
gaps and steep learning curves between practitioner 
diplomats and vendors not to mention researchers. 
(Compare to Knuuttila et al. [9] 
 
These gaps must be bridged with research in order to 
help the OSCE and other IGO´s to better fulfill their 
crisis governing mandates for peacebuilding in the 
future. 
 
2.1.RPAS as an Information System 
 
The special role given to deployment of RPASs as an 
information system is based on following features: 
- In RPAS “at the maximum 30 % of the system is 
flying and 70 % is on the ground including the pilot, 
why expression “unmanned” is not adequate 
[interviews]. This is not usually understood by vendors 
of these systems, who use the same approach as to car 
buyers: “Flexibility was also the key to success when 
the SMM was in urgent need of unarmed unmanned 
aerial vehicles (UAVs) and an additional 70 armored 
vehicles in the summer.”[3] 
-RPAS deployment is literally crossing borders not only 
geographically but also between intelligence, 
diplomatic and public spheres: What used to be sole 
property of more or less military intelligence services 
has now become open to diplomats as well as to public. 
Diplomats employed by the OSCE secretariat moderate 
the information flow to their colleagues and to the 
public. 
- RPASs, as everything else including financing, were 
brought into to OSCE’s Ukraine SMM in very rapid and 
flexible manner, which is exposing the strengths and 
weaknesses to research. Everybody understands the 
constraints caused by rapid set-up of SMM and makes 
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exchange of views easy including talking to researchers 
regardless your political standpoint or nationality. 
 
3. The Rapid Set-Up of Ukraine SMM 
Using RPASs; Recognizing Gaps 
from Practice  
 
RPASs usage is spreading to other IGO´s to be used for 
remote sensing in areas and duties, where manned 
aircrafts are unfeasible [5][18]. Ukraine SMM is now in 
avantgarde of civilian RPASs use and lessons learned 
from there are in focus by all major players of 
diplomatic scene including by-lined military services. 
 
3.1. Research Method and Knowledge 
Acquisition 
 
This survey-type paper is based on, and its conclusions 
are drawn from, the interaction between six sources: 
 
1. Participation in and facilitation of a two-day 
Thematic Meeting of the OSCE Border 
Security and Management National Focal 
Points Network on Emerging Technologies in 
Border Security and Management – Use of 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and related 
expert discussions in October 2015. 
2. Discussions in“Breaking the Ice of Frozen 
Conflicts? Understanding Territorial Conflicts 
in East and Southeast Europe” in July 2016, 
seminar organized by the University of 
Regensburg 
3. 21 semi-structured expert interviews of various 
players involved in and associated with 
political diplomatic processes in the OSCE and 
its Parliamentary Assembly meeting in 
Helsinki June 2015 and the deployment of 
RPAS by the OSCE in monitoring the Ukraine 
crisis [5].  
4. Follow-up of public OSCE reporting on its 
activities related to Ukraine and missions in 
general.[3] 
5. Literature review of related recent articles in 
political science and information systems. 
6. Learnings from the participation into 5 year 
EU-funded AIRBEAM project, in which 
among other outcomes 599 law enforcement 
authorities´ use scenarios for unmanned aerial 
vehicles were drafted [17] 
 
To facilitate the answering of the research question gaps 
from literature in and from practice have been 
recognized and bridged as far as possible in the 
premises of this article. 
 
 
3.2.Set-up of Ukraine SMM 
 
The OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine 
is being deployed following a request to the OSCE by 
the government of Ukraine and a consensus agreement 
by all 57 OSCE participating States. The monitors are 
to contribute to reducing tensions and fostering peace, 
stability and security [17]. A lot of attention was paid to 
keep SMM’s “civilian character and civilian face. 
Nonetheless, an “add-on” military mission might be 
considered in support of the SMM, but it would need a 
separate mandate.” [15]] 
 
Germany, France, Italy and Russian Federation offered 
military UAV support to SMM during mandate 
negotiations. After this offer informal discussions 
started about usage of military UAVs to support SMM 
for gathering information. ”Only the UAVs would fly 
over the conflict zone and the military personnel – 
armed and in uniform – would stay outside it. [15] 
While these political level consultations over military 
UAV “add-on” usage went on the OSCE had already 
deployed commercially operated civilian UAVs, which 
carried out their maiden flight on 23 October 2014 near 
Mariupol. “This was exactly four months after the idea 
of using UAVs was first voiced in an internal concept 
paper, and just over three months after the decision was 
made. Given the lead times that such projects usually 
have, this, alongside the rapid deployment of the SMM 
in March 2014 is another example how fast the OSCE 
is able to react. 
 
“By deploying unmanned aircraft systems the OSCE 
wanted to show that they were up to date … This 
deployment was not intended for the situation that later 
developed in Ukraine” [5] 
 
In March 2014, all 57 participating States of the OSCE 
unanimously agreed to establish the OSCE Special 
Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine. The SMM to 
Ukraine is an unarmed, civilian mission and its main 
tasks are to observe and report in an impartial and 
objective way on the situation. The SMM also 
establishes and reports facts in response to specific 
incidents [18].  
 
A separate confidential memorandum of understanding 
was drawn up concerning the operating of RPAS in 
Ukrainian air space.  
 
“A lot of attention was paid to the establishment of the 
(RPAS) service itself into Ukraine … and not to make a 
process that would link the data from the RPA to the 
political reporting to the OSCE headquarters in Vienna.” 
[5] 
 
On the 17th of October 2014 Didier Burkhalter, Swiss 
Foreign Minister and OSCE Chairperson-in Office 
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thanked Italy, France, Germany, Ukraine and Russia for 
their offers to place RPAs and associated personnel at 
the disposal of the OSCE in order to enhance its 
monitoring capacities in Ukraine [20]. 
 
On the 23th of October 2014 the OSCE SMM 
successfully completed the maiden flight of its 
unarmed RPAs. The RPASs (Schiebel 
CAMCOPTER® S-100) were being provided, flown 
and maintained by the Austrian company Schiebel. 
They are under contract to the OSCE and under the 
authority and direction of the SMM. Data collected is 
the property of the OSCE and for the sole use of that 
organization. 
 
Picture 2. CAMCOPTER® S-100, prior to deployment by 
the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine [21] A 
new service provider is taking over the RPASs service 
for SMM by using three different RPAs for different 
operation distances.[5] 
 
3.3.Gaps from Practice  
 
An analysis of practice related literature and interviews 
for this study in italic about the deployment of 
RPA/UAVs reveal at least following gaps from the 
practice: 
 
a) gap between political requirements and 
technical realities 
b) gap in political trust between major member 
states 
c) gap in the procurement/vending process 
d) gap in trained personnel 
e) gap in desired time for design, testing and 
deployment 
f) gap - or rather lack – of desired information 
system(s) as outcome(s) 
g) gap in beliefs vs. realities, what RPASs can 
contribute 
h) gab etween military and civil efforts to deploy 
RPASs 
 
4. Modeling the Multi-modal OSCE to 
meet Orchestrating theories 
An agency’s mandate shapes its approach to 
peacebuilding, and hence the conception of this term 
employed by agency staff. The objectives sought and 
the strategies employed are profoundly influenced by 
whether an entity is located within the UN Secretariat, 
a UN specialized agency, a European organization (the 
European Union, EU; the Organization for Security and 
Co-operation in Europe, OSCE), or merely within the 
government of an individual member state. [26] 
 
4.1. Orchestrating Monitoring: the 
Adaptation of Ukraine Toolbox 
 
Like the crisis in and around Ukraine developed 
step by step, which were far from equal in size and 
timing, the corresponding Ukraine toolbox evolved 
gradually in different decision making forum of the 
OSCE structures, which involve levels from 
parliamentary and inter-governmental to OSCE intra-
agency actions. 
 
 “The OSCE has been and is using 14 different kinds 
of structures and organizations in governance of crisis in 
and around Ukraine. They all have their mandate, birth 
history and rulings based on consensus decisions made in 
some phase of the OSCE process. In everyday use they are 
called “OSCE’s Ukraine toolbox” [5] 
 
Due to space limitations in this paper cannot present the 
table) to start modeling of “Ukraine toolbox” [22], 
which will be helpful for future work by explaining the 
nature of each tool and their inter-play would take 
several papers’ space. Most likely, further study of 
simultaneous functioning of these different tools in 
accordance to orchestration theory will lead to develop 
the classifications and conceptual taxonomies of Dai 
[16] and Abbot et al. [10]. 
 
4.2. Addressing the OSCE´s Procurement 
Processes 
 
The successful adaptation of RPASs should always 
include structured design, purchase, and 
implementation projects. These should take into 
account the operating of the flying platform, attached 
sensors, communications, and information sharing with 
other information systems, such as command and 
control or situational awareness systems[19] 
 
The following structure was able to function without 
“cumbersome procedures” [15] in case of the OSCE´s 
Ukraine SMM. See the following picture’s corner down 
left, where category “Goods” takes care of ICT and 
RPAS procurement like buying cars for the mission. 
 
 
427
469 
Picture 3.Task-Oriented Management according 
to OSCE´s GO Programme [23]_  
 
Experience was gained (for the OSCE) in the use of 
RPAS in United Nation missions in Africa It is unclear 
how this experience was taken into account when 
deploying RPAS in a rushed manner in the OSCE mission 
in Ukraine.” [5]. 
 
 When the use of RPASs was established, all 
attention was focused on getting approval for flights 
from Ukraine. At that time a crisis was not yet at hand 
and RPA flights were considered to be a measure of 
building confidence [5].   
“The costs of RPAS usage started to swallow an ever 
greater part of the 88 million Euro mission budget, 
because flights became more and more frequent”, and 
“better, more expensive surveillance cameras were 
added”. “One RPA with this equipment including anti-
jamming capacities may cost over one million euros and 
insurance costs with tightening conditions are sky-
rocketing for use in Ukraine SMM.” [5].  
 
The OSCE is in need of a comprehensive 
informating system to serve all stakeholders of 
“Ukraine toolbox”. 
 
Therefore a proven system for information system 
creation and procurement like in following Picture 4 is 
needed. How many of this boxes in the Picture can be 
really worked through, when next politically motivated 
rapid ICT deployment will take place? 
 
 
 
Picture 4. Software intensive IS acquisition process 
[24] 
 
4.3. Gaps from literature 
 
Adding the first gap from literature to be added to the 
above-mentioned list of gaps from practice in previous 
chapter: 
 
i) gap in Abbot et al.’s orchestrating theory, 
which does not cover the OSCE in general and 
has not yet been applied to it and its “Ukraine 
toolkit” ( described in chapter 2)  
j) gap in the deployment/procurement of 
information system(s) in crisis in a rapid 
manner  (see chapter 4.2 above). 
k) gap in the modeling of multi-lateral diplomacy 
real workflows , not by-the-book in nowaday´s 
computing age, in which new diplomat and 
staff  generations use their devices and internet 
presence disregarding generation gaps as they 
please 
l) gap in the “reverse engineering” ,like going 
back to pencil and paper and meetings without  
IT tools, due to mistrust in  information 
security measures in diplomacy governance 
after the cases of a state eavesdropping another 
state by using ICT[5], not to mention  
Snowden, Manning, Assange, Wikileaks etc. 
 
The OSCE has been and is using 14 different kinds of 
structures and organizations in governance of crisis in 
and around Ukraine. They all have their mandate, birth 
history and rulings based on consensus decisions made 
in some phase of the OSCE process. In everyday use 
they are called “OSCE’s Ukraine toolbox” [5Due to 
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space limitations in this paper we concentrate into to the 
table row number 4 OSCE Special Monitoring Mission. 
Modeling, which might be very helpful for future work, 
and explaining the nature of each tool and their inter-
play would take several papers’ space. 
 
5. Conclusions: Topics for New 
Research 
 
In the introduction two disciplines, which “orchestrate”, 
were presented. These disciplines, Social and 
Information Systems Sciences, have different 
approaches to crisis governance. In the special crisis 
informatics number of CSCW Journal it was concluded:  
 
Research in civil security and crisis management usually aims 
to improve the ‘resilience’ of a system (e.g., a company, a 
city, a community, a nation), its ability to resist disturbances 
of its consistent state as well as its ability to return to this 
consistent state once being disturbed. It has been a remarkable 
development that even at important publication venues in 
crisis management, the analysis of and the design for 
collaborative settings has become the predominant research 
discourse (see e.g. the proceedings of the ISCRAM 2014 
conference, recent issues of journals like the International 
Journal on Information Systems in Crisis Response and 
Management (IJISCRAM) or the Journal on Homeland 
Security and Emergency Management (JHSEM)). The path to 
improving resilience in practice may, however, remain 
difficult, as relying on collaboration always means to risk 
one’s own autonomy.[18] 
 
The last sentence comes in a way to regret the loss of 
power in case of collaboration, which is one form 
Abbot et al.[10] orchestration taxonomy, of which’s 
one basic starting point is the division and use of power 
by different actors in order to reach for target. 
 
Information Systems angle may be seen narrower from 
micro-organizational approach raising bottom-up from 
the experiences by and consequences for a single 
organization, which need to be analyzed, too. 
 
There are obviously two levels of orchestrations, which 
have been illustrated in the following Picture 5. In the 
upper part are Social Science based macro-level 
orchestrations, which use their political mandate in a 
top-down manner by inter-governmental organizations 
like OSCE in and around Ukraine. In the lower part 
there are Information Systems based needs for micro-
level orchestrations for inter-governmental 
organizations and, for instance, for their RPAS service 
providers.  
 
The macro-level approach misses the details, technical 
insights and methods of IS like socio-technical 
methodology in designing information systems. On the 
other-hand micro-level approach cannot overcome or 
go around the constraints laid by power and other 
structures by using intermediaries in a creative manner, 
which is the core of Abbot et al.[10] orchestration 
theory. IS people take the number of actors and their 
roles more “given” and keep the actors in their 
traditional collaborative roles and modes, while OSCE 
diplomats and staff are in more innovative mood to 
fight for peace. 
 
How to make these Social Science orchestration 
theories to shake hands with IS orchestration 
technologies? Picture 5 gives only a limited, partial 
answer to the research question. 
 
These hand-shakings are needed to start working for 
bridging the gaps pointed out in this paper. These hand-
shakings should take place by arranging future R&D 
meetings and workshops including not only  
practitioner OSCE  diplomats and staff and vendors, but 
also interested researchers from their Social, IS and 
other Science’s silos away from their comfort zones to 
review Ukrainian demarcation zones and ICT used 
there. These zones are more powerful environments 
than before (e.g. in 1994) in terms of finding new 
research gaps as this article shows. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Picture 5. Elements for further socio-technical 
development of orchestration theory for crisis 
governance in the OSCE framework. Arrows 
symbolize research gaps. 
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Of course, this micro-macro-level contrasting has its 
limitations, but it may offer new venues to further 
theory building. 
 
More research is needed to seek common denominators 
to these different orchestrating communities in order to 
find answers to the research question, whether IS R&D 
community can meet the challenges of macro-level 
orchestration done in the IGOs like OSCE?  
At the moment it seems, that modeling and theory 
building work done in the Social Science side is 
leading. Picture 5 gives only a limited , partial answer 
to the research question, what kind of lessons should be 
develop by using knowledge and skills of Social and IS 
scientists , too. 
OSCE´s role as orchestrator needs more research as 
suggested above, but one must remember that the 
conductors – in order to continue the use of musical 
metaphors – of the crisis scene are sides of the crises.  
As OSCE SMM Chief Monitor Apakan in his 
statement  at the UN Security Council (11 December 
2015) said: 
 
“All activities by the SMM are guided by the aim to 
achieve normalization and stabilization of the situation in 
Ukraine. As our numbers expand, these efforts will be 
further strengthened. But the political will for a full 
ceasefire and a political solution and peace must come 
from the sides [of crisis].” 
 
Only political solution and peace will enable f further 
orchestrating for the build-up of civil society in and 
around Ukraine. This will be “ more of a Jazz Ensemble 
than a Classical Concert “ with partiture as German 
Foreign Minister  Frank-Walter Steinmeier put it [25]. 
 
How ready, able and welcome are the IS  and Social 
Science researchers to join the “jam sessions” in  the 
OSCE HQ salons, which hosted the Vienna Dancing 
Conference on European security 200 years ago? 
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